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a b s t r a c t
This study examines whether a liquidity shock to a banking system could be transmitted to
other economies through a network of bank ownership. Firstly we construct cross-border
ownership networks for banks located in European countries. We then exploit the 2010
European debt crisis as a natural experiment. The analysis shows that subsidiary banks
located outside of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) but with ownership
linkages to these countries have a lower loan growth rate during the crisis period. This sug-
gests that the liquidity shock experienced by GIIPS countries was indeed transmitted to
those banks through ownership linkages. Larger subsidiary banks and those subsidiaries
that were more profitable are found to be more resilient to the shock. We also find that
the parent bank’s characteristics affect the transmission of the shock, supporting the notion
of an internal capital market operating within these banks.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
This study provides empirical evidence on whether foreign bank ownership linkages can transmit external liquidity
shocks. The past two decades has witnessed extensive globalisation of the financial sector. Banks from one country to the
next are increasingly connected by cross-border interbank lending relationships and ownership ties. Additionally, there
has been a large increase in the presence of foreign-owned banks in a typical domestic banking system. The overall share
of domestic banking assets held by foreign banks has increased from 15% in 1995 to 23% in 2005 (International Monetary
Fund, 2007). As a result, the role of foreign banks and foreign-owned domestic banks in the banking system has become
more important, in both developed countries and emerging markets.
Yet the implications of increasing foreign banks are not well understood in literature. On one hand, access to foreign
banking capital may intensify the competition of the domestic banking sector, thereby stimulating financial innovation,
and the efficiency of domestic companies (Claessens et al., 2001; Sturm andWilliams, 2004). Such ‘spillovers’ can help estab-
lish a modern financial system in developing countries and led to better financial regulations (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). On
the other hand, a large proportion of foreign owned banks in the domestic banking system could increase a country’s expo-
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sure to an international liquidity shock. If so, micro-prudential policies should be designed in order to limit the potential
contagion so that the financial stability of the domestic banking system is preserved.
The European sovereign debt crisis that began in 2010 provides an excellent quasi-natural experiment to test possible
contagion effects. This shock generated a liquidity crisis in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain (GIIPS). We show how this
shock was propagated to the other European countries through ownership linkages of banks and their subsidiaries. The con-
tribution of this paper is twofold. First, our paper provides cross-country bank-level evidence that liquidity shocks from cer-
tain countries could be transmitted to other countries through bank ownership linkages. Papers in the literature have
explored shocks from a single country (Peek and Rosengren, 2000), or a global shock transmitted to a single country
(Aiyar, 2012; Schnabl, 2012). However, evidence from cross-country analysis is scarce (noting Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2011) and crucially, we exploit information on ownership to identify the transmission mechanism. This is the main novelty
and contribution of the paper. Additionally, our paper provides new evidence based on the 2010 European sovereign debt
crisis. While other papers in the literature have used the 2008 global financial crisis (Aiyar, 2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2011) or the Japanese financial crisis in 1990s (Peek and Rosengren, 2000) or the Russian default in 1998 (Schnabl, 2012),
the European sovereign debt crisis is unique in many ways. In particular, it generated severe liquidity shocks in several coun-
tries which required international financial support. As such our paper provides important information on the effect of finan-
cial integration of European countries over the past two decades.
We make use of subsidiary bank level data to construct ownership networks for banks located in all European countries.
The exposure to the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries is constructed for each international banking group (network) as mea-
sured by the proportion of their total banking assets in GIIPS countries. Then the banking group level exposure is assigned to
each bank within the network. For example, we classify a bank as highly exposed to the crisis if the proportion of its group’s
total assets in GIIPS countries is high.2
Our working hypothesis is drawn from the theory of capital markets developed by Morgan et al. (2004). Their analysis
predicts that banks exposed to a sovereign crisis will reduce their lending during the crisis period in order to support their
parent or subsidiary banks. In our case, it will be the subsidiary banks in non-GIIPS countries with higher exposure to GIIPS
countries through their ownership linkages who will reduce their lending. We label this as the contagion effect and estimate
using the difference-in-differences (DID) method. The baseline results from the DID regressions imply that a bank’s lending
growth rate would reduce by 5.75 percentage points if the bank’s exposure increases by 1 percent. The results support the
hypothesis that highly exposed banks’ lending performance is negatively affected by the foreign liquidity shock due to the
cross-border ownership linkages.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We review the related literature on banking networks and the potential for
shocks to work through the banking system. In Section 3 we describe the empirical framework, including how we use the
information on ownership and exposure to the sovereign crises. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics before explaining
the DID method in Section 5 which generates the results in Section 6. Section 7 aims to establish robustness before Section 8
concludes.
2. Literature review
The banking literature has explored the role of the internal capital market within a banking group. This literature provides
a theoretical grounding as to why a liquidity shock can be transmitted through bank ownership linkages. Using US bank data
provided by the Federal Reserve Y-9 tapes and the Federal Reserve Reports of Income and Condition (Call Report) from 1986
to 1989, Houston et al. (1997) suggest that there is an internal capital market established by the bank holding company allo-
cating scarce capital resources among the subsidiary banks. Morgan et al. (2004) examine the effect of the integration of the
US banking system during economic volatility. The empirical results support the idea of an internal capital market, through
which inter-state banks smooth business cycles. Furthermore, there is evidence for multinational banks; for instance,
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) suggest that the parent bank and its foreign subsidiary often borrow and lend through their
internal capital market; they show that large global-oriented banks in the US use the internal capital markets with their for-
eign subsidiaries to smooth domestic liquidity shocks. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) construct a network for 45 large
multinational banks and their foreign subsidiaries. They support the hypothesis that there exists an internal capital market
within international banking groups, and that there is a positive relationship between a parent bank’s financial strength and
a subsidiary bank’s loan growth.
Along side these benefits of being part of a bank network, there is the risk that the foreign subsidiary banks are too depen-
dent on its parent, especially for subsidiaries located in emerging markets where capital is relatively scarce and expensive,
and alternative funding sources are more difficult to find. In this case, a liquidity shock received by a parent bank can be
ultimately transmitted to its vulnerable foreign subsidiaries through an internal lending channel. Using the Japanese banking
crisis in 1990s as a quasi-natural experiment, Peek and Rosengren (2000) show that Japanese banks in the US significantly
reduced loan supply during the crisis and this loan supply shock had a negative real effect on economic activities since
2 This is an appropriate measure because banks located in a GIIPS country are those most affected by the sovereign shock. Indeed, banks hold more domestic
government debts rather than foreign debts on their balance sheet, a phenomenon known as home bias. If there is a sovereign credit event, domestic banks as
government bond holders are directly affected.
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demand for loans cannot easily be fulfilled with alternative forms of financing. Looking at the recent global financial crisis,
Aiyar (2012) uses UK quarterly bank-level data from the Bank of England to show that an external funding shock had a sig-
nificant and substantial impact on domestic lending activities. Specifically, the evidence suggests that subsidiaries and
branches of foreign banks tighten their credit supply more than domestic banks during the crisis.
Popov and Udell (2010) examine whether the recent global financial crisis which erupted in advanced economies was
transmitted to central and eastern Europe through foreign banks. They construct an index to measure the level of financial
distress in the 14 countries in the region and exploit the data on SMEs provided by the 2008 Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey. The results of this study imply that SMEs in central and eastern Europe would have a higher
probability of rejection on their loan applications if the banking system was dominated by foreign banks. Another study on
Eastern European countries by Ongena et al. (2015) support these results. It is shown that during the recent financial crisis,
internationally-borrowing local banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks reduce their loans more than locally funded banks,
while lending by banks with more retail deposits are relatively stable no matter whether the banks are foreign-owned or
borrowing internationally.
Schnabl (2012) exploits the 1998 Russian default to examine how a liquidity shock received by international banks was
transmitted to Peru. Taking advantage of detailed interbank lending databases provided by the central bank of Peru, the
author shows that the liquidity shock was transmitted through an international interbank lending channel. Compared with
locally funded banks, both internationally borrowing banks and foreign owned banks are affected more by this channel.
Specifically, foreign owned banks perform relatively better than those borrowing abroad, since international banks reduce
their interbank lending to these banks more than their foreign subsidiaries. Anginer et al. (2014) examine the association
of default risk between international parent banks in developed countries and their subsidiaries in emerging economies dur-
ing the recent financial crisis, rather than transmission channels of the liquidity shock. Controlling for different financial reg-
ulation across different countries, they show a significant and positive correlation between a parent’s and a subsidiary’s
default risk. Moreover, it shows that the default risk of subsidiaries with higher capital, retail deposits, profitability and inde-
pendency is less correlated with the parents’ default risk.
The above papers focus on a liquidity shock in a single country transmitted into another country (Peek and Rosengren,
2000), or a global liquidity shock transmitted to a single country (Aiyar, 2012). We build on these papers by providing evi-
dence at the level of the banks and their subsidiaries on the operation of an internal capital market with a cross-country set-
ting. A prior cross-country analysis (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011) examines whether a liquidity crisis in advanced
economies could be transmitted to emerging markets through foreign banks at country level. Our paper adds to this work,
by including both developed and developing economies in our sample and testing at the bank level whether bank ownership
linkages across Europe can serve as a vehicle to transmit liquidity shocks. This proposition has yet to be tested in the
literature.
3. Empirical setting
3.1. The crisis as an experiment
In December 2009, Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P downgraded the rating for Greek sovereign credit when they perceived that
the Greek government was suffering from public deficit difficulties. During April 2010, Greek bonds were downgraded to
junk status by S&P. This event is typically regarded as the start of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Immediately after, Moo-
dy’s downgraded the rating for the Irish sovereign debt, and Spain lost its top credit rating. The crisis further deepened in
2011 when Portuguese and Italian sovereign debt rating were downgraded.
Fig. 1 depicts the CDS (Credit Default Swap) spread of GIIPS countries’ 5-year sovereign debt, along with the CDS spread of
German 5-year bond as a comparison. A CDS is a financial arrangement by which the buyer of the CDS will be protected by
the seller in the event of credit default. Thus, the CDS spread for sovereign indicates the default risk of the sovereign debts, so
Fig. 1 describes the evolution of the sovereign debt crisis.
Banks holding downgraded bonds may begin to suffer liquidity issues. As Popov and Van Horen (2015) and De Marco
(2013) suggest, there may be two channels through which the valuation haircut on the GIIPS sovereign debts have a negative
effect on a bank’s liquidity and thus lending activities. These are the ‘funding channel’ and ‘capital channel’. Banks are likely
to be affected by a sovereign credit event through the funding channel because the value reduction of the sovereign debt
directly weakens the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet, and also affects the bank’s borrowing capacity in the interbank
lending market due to the fact that banks often use sovereign debt as collateral. They are also likely to be shocked through
the capital channel because the capital loss due to the devaluation of sovereign debt may drive a bank’s capital ratio below
the regulatory ratio. In response, the bank reduces lending to maintain their capital ratio. Therefore, the sovereign debt crisis
can be seen as a liquidity shock for banks who were holding a relatively large amount of impaired sovereign debts in their
portfolio. Since banks usually tend to hold more domestic sovereign debts rather than foreign government bonds (an effect
known as home bias), the GIIPS sovereign debt crisis represents a severe liquidity shock to banks located in GIIPS countries.
Fig. 2 shows the overall GIIPS sovereign debt holdings for 21 EU banking systems, as recorded by the European Banking
Authority (EBA) stress test in 2010, 2011 and 2014. The tests selected banking groups to cover at least 50% market share of a
country’s banking system. Though it is not a complete survey for all the banks in the sampled countries, the result is the best
160 Y. Cao et al. / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 53 (2018) 158–178
proxy available for the European banking system. As the figure shows, excluding GIIPS Countries, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus
and Luxembourg had a relative high exposure to GIIPS sovereign debts in 2010. Significantly, banks in these countries
reduced their GIIPS debt holdings during the crisis. Meanwhile, the portfolio of GIIPS banks contains a consistent home bias
over the same period. Thus if the valuation haircut of sovereign debt has a negative effect on a bank’s liquidity, it is very
likely that banks in GIIPS country had received the strongest liquidity shock due to the crisis.
Fig. 3 illustrates the trend of bank credit supply in GIIPS countries and Germany during the crisis period. The growth rate
of bank lending fell sharply during the 2008 and 2009 due to the global financial crisis. This can be interpreted as a common
trend before the sovereign debt crisis. At the beginning of 2010, banks in all countries show a recovery of their credit supply.
However, the trends start to diverge when the sovereign shock comes in April 2010. The growth rate of bank lending in GIIPS
country shrinks again during the crisis while German banks increase their lending with a low but stable growth rate. It is
worth noting that the poor performance of German banks might also be partly due to the crisis in GIIPS countries. In addition,
Fig. 4 shows the interest spread on the policy rate for new loans for the same countries from 2007 to 2014. The story is sim-
ilar, the trends started to diverge as the crisis occurs. Overall, the evidence shows that banks in GIIPS countries appear to
have suffered from liquidity problems during the crisis period, and this can be attributed to the sovereign debt crisis.
3.2. Network construction and exposure measurement
Ownership networks connect banks in GIIPS countries with banks in other European economies not directly exposed to
the impaired sovereign debts. An effective ownership linkage between a parent and a subsidiary bank is defined by a control
stake where the parent bank holds 50% or more of the subsidiary bank’s total equity. Fig. 5 provides an illustration of the
three possible scenarios of the network. Scenario 1 shows the case that both the parent bank P1 and the subsidiary bank
S1 are located outside of GIIPS countries, so this banking group has no linkages with banks in GIIPS countries thus they
do not have any direct exposure to the liquidity crisis in the GIIPS banking system. In scenario 2, one of the two subsidiary
banks S4 is located in a GIIPS country, thus there is a possibility that the liquidity shock received by S4 could be transmitted to
the parent bank P2 and the other subsidiary S2. The last possible scenario is that the parent bank is located in GIIPS country.
As scenario 3 shows, the parent bank P3 and subsidiary bank S5 are located in GIIPS countries while the other subsidiary bank
S3 is located in other economies. In this scenario, it is plausible that the liquidity shock in GIIPS countries may have an effect
on S3 since it has a relatively large exposure.
Fig. 1. CDS spread of GIIPS sovereign debts (5 Year), by country. Notes: This figure depicts the CDS spread of GIIPS sovereign debt which captures the default
risk of the government, thus describes the evolution of the sovereign debt crisis. The unit for Greek debt’s CDS spread is depicted by the vertical axis to the
right. As it shows, after the Greek bond was downgraded to junk status in April 2010, the sovereign crisis formally erupted and the CDS spread of all GIIPS
countries started to scramble up, while the CDS spread of German bonds remained low and stable during the whole period. Source: Datastream.
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The main objective of this study is to test whether the liquidity shock received by either S4; S5 or P3 would be transmitted
to S2 and S3, respectively, through cross-border ownership linkages. In other words, it focuses on whether subsidiary banks
S1; S2 and S3 behave differently during the crisis due to the ownership linkages with banks in GIIPS countries.
It is necessary to identify the degree of exposure to the crisis based on the identified cross-country bank ownership net-
works. In order to do this, we create an exposure measurement for the banking groups, indicating the extent to which the
subsidiary banks are exposed to the crisis. The measurement can be given by the equation below
Exposureit ¼
X
k
Assetsikt
Total Assetsit
 CDSkt
Fig. 2. GIIPS sovereign debt exposure, by country. Notes: This figure shows to what extent a banking system of a EU country was exposed to GIIPS sovereign
debts, which is revealed by the EBA stress tests. As it shows, despite GIIPS countries, banks in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg were highly
exposed to the GIIPS debts in 2010. However, those banks significantly reduced their GIIPS debt holding during the crisis. Meanwhile, the sovereign debt
portfolio of banks in GIIPS countries performed a consistent home bias. Data for Austria, Germany, France, UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden in March 2010 is missing. Source: European Banking Authority, Stress Test 2010, 2011 and 2014.
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Fig. 3. Growth rate of loans to domestic non-financial corporations, by country. Notes: This figure presents the loan growth rate to domestic non-financial
companies for GIIPS countries and Germany. Banks in all GIIPS countries and also Germany reduce their lending significantly during the global financial
crisis in 2008. In the beginning of 2010, banks in all countries tend to recover their credit supply. However, the trends start to diverge when the sovereign
shock comes up in April 2010. Growth rate of bank lending in GIIPS country shrinks again during the crisis while German banks increase their lending with a
low but stable rate. Source: European Central Bank Data Warehouse.
Fig. 4. Interest spread (on ECB deposit facility) for new loans to non-financial corporations, by country. Notes: As this figure shows, the interest spread in
GIIPS countries start to rise up after the shock while the spread in Germany is relatively low and stable during the crisis period. Together with Fig. 4,
evidence shows that there is a liquidity squeeze in banking system of GIIPS countries during the sovereign debt crisis. Source: European Central Bank Data
Warehouse.
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where i identifies the banking group, t denotes time point and k stands for each GIIPS country. TotalAssetsit is the total assets
of the parent banks of the banking group. The first term captures the extent to which the banking groups are involved with
the business in GIIPS countries, thus the exposure of the banking group to the crisis. The second term, CDSkt captures the
intensity of the crisis in different countries. Therefore the exposure of each subsidiary bank outside of the GIIPS countries
is given by the calculated exposure of the banking group.
Fig. 6 illustrates an example of a simple bank ownership network across European countries, as in scenario 2. The parent
bank of this banking business group is located in a non-GIIPS European country, say France, while it has two subsidiaries in
GIIPS countries, S2 in Greece (GR) and S3 in Italy (IT). There are also two subsidiary banks S1 and S4 located in non-GIIPS coun-
tries, which could be both domestic subsidiaries in France or foreign subsidiaries in countries like Germany or the UK. The
exposure to the crisis for S1 and S4 at time t are then given by the exposure of this banking group X at time t:
ExposureXt ¼
AssetsS2t  CDSGRt þ AssetsS3t  CDSITt
Total AssetsXt
where Total AssetsXt ¼ AssetsPt þ
P4
i¼1AssetsSit .
3.3. Theory and hypothesis
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) propose an incentive model for financial intermediation. This model suggests that the moral
hazard problem of firms as a borrower can be alleviated by monitoring from banks, but banks as financial intermediators can
neglect to monitor and thus also generate a moral hazard problem to depositors (indirect investors). In this case, banks’ loan-
able funds and firms’ investment spending are determined by the stock of bank capital and firm collateral. Both a credit
crunch caused by a capital shock on banking system and a collateral squeeze in the real economy can reduce the loanable
funds and investment spending. Morgan et al. (2004) extend this model to a two-state version to analyse the effect of inter-
state banking on economic volatility in the US during the bank integration process after 1978. The model shows that the
effect of a credit crunch in a state can be dampened under the interstate banking regime while a collateral squeeze will
be amplified through the internal capital market between banks.
This conceptual framework can easily be extended to the context of multinational banks where there is some non-
negative degree of capital mobility between host countries. The application of this model for explaining the effect of multi-
national banks during the European debt crisis is illustrated in Fig. 7, with two classical demand-supply diagrams. The X-axis
denotes the loan quantity and Y-axis denotes loan rate or bank capital return. Consider country 1 as one of the five GIIPS
countries and country 2 as a non-GIIPS European country. The valuation haircut of the GIIPS debts may reduce the liquidity
of banks in country 1 through both the capital channel and the funding channel, which shifts the bank credit supply curve to
the left, resulting in a lower amount of bank lending and a higher interest rate. This process is supported by the trend of loan
growth and interest spread depicted in Figs. 3 and 4.
If there is no multinational banking, the story would end here and nothing would happen in country 2. However, country
1 and country 2 are connected by bank ownership networks. Observing higher capital return in country 1, the bank holding
company or headquarters will reallocate their banking assets across countries, by reducing their lending in country 2 and
Fig. 5. 3 scenarios of bank ownership network. Notes: This figure illustrates 3 possible scenarios of bank ownership network in this study. Pi stands for
parent banks and Si stands for subsidiary banks. Scenario 1 is the case that both parent banks and subsidiary bank are located in non-GIIPS countries thus
this banking group is not exposed to the crisis. Scenario 2 shows that one subsidiary of the banking group is located in GIIPS country thus there is a
possibility that the liquidity shock received by S4 could be transmitted to the parent bank P2 and the other subsidiary bank S2 . The last possible scenario is
that the parent bank is located in GIIPS country. In this case, it is very likely that the liquidity shock received by the parent bank would be transmitted to S3
through the ownership linkage.
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increasing credit supply in country 1. The mitigation of the liquidity shock in country 1 due to the internal capital market is
called the ‘support effect’ by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), and we call the credit contraction in country 2 the ‘contagion
effect’, since the liquidity shock spills over through the internal capital market. The major objective of this study is thus to
identify the contagion effect in the banking system of non-GIIPS countries during the European sovereign debt crisis.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
In Section 3.2, a bank is defined as a parent bank’s subsidiary if 50% or more of its total equity are directly held by the
parent bank. 50% is the natural cutoff which gives the parent bank absolute control over its subsidiary and hence plausibly
part of the internal capital market. In order to identify banks ownership ties, we extract banks’ shareholder information from
Bankscope and then link parent banks with their subsidiaries.3 Finally we construct bank ownership networks across Euro-
pean countries by using banks’ shareholder information in the year of 2010, which is the starting point of the sovereign debt
crisis.
Table 1 shows the sample of countries used in this study and the number of parent banks and subsidiary banks in each
country that could be identified from the data. The data records information for 8872 banks from which we could observe
Fig. 7. Internal capital market hypothesis. Notes: In the left panel, a liquidity shock at the banking system of Country 1 lead to a lower level of loan supply
and a higher loan interest rate. If Country 2 is connected with Country 1 by bank ownership networks, the model predicts that the shock will be alleviated in
Country 1 but transmitted to Country 2 in the right panel, through the channel of banking group’s internal capital market.
Fig. 6. Example of a simple network Notes: This figure illustrates an example of a simple network in scenario 2 where the parent bank P is located in non-
GIIPS country.
3 Some banks’ shareholders are also owned by other European banks. In this case, these banks are all defined as the subsidiaries of the ultimate parent banks.
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shareholder information for 709 subsidiary banks belonging to 281 banking groups. We limit our sample to include four
types of banks: commercial banks, cooperative banks, mortgage banks, and saving banks. Bank holding companies are ini-
tially included in the sample in order to construct the ownership network, as the holding company is the most important
node in a ownership network. Once the networks are constructed, we drop bank holding companies from our sample
because they do not function as the other four types of banks that collect deposit and originate loans.
As Table 1 shows, 455 subsidiary banks are located in Western European countries while 254 subsidiary banks are based
in Eastern Europe. In terms of parent banks, there are 238 banks from Western Europe and 43 banks are located in Eastern
European countries. Subsidiary banks in GIIPS countries are not included in the sample since this study focus on subsidiary
banks in non-GIIPS countries only. However, subsidiary banks are allowed to be owned by parent banks in GIIPS country, in
which case the banking group would be in scenario 3 according to our taxonomy.
Banks’ balance sheet data are also obtained from Bankscope. We collect bank-level unconsolidated data for 709 subsidiary
banks and 281 parent banks, from 2008 to 2013, resulting in an unbalanced panel dataset. We also collect GDP growth rate
and unemployment rate data for the sample banks’ host and home countries from the World Bank DataBank. Table 2 pre-
sents the summary statistics for the variables that used in our econometric analysis.
The key variable of interest in this study is the subsidiary bank’s exposure to the crisis. In order to scale the bank’s expo-
sure according to the intensity of the crisis, we collect CDS spread data for GIIPS country’s 5-year senior debts from
DataStream.4 We take the average level of sovereign debt CDS spread in December each year to scale the bank’s exposure.
As a result, exposure becomes a time-varying variable though the ownership network is constant. Since the magnitude of
the CDS spread varies remarkably (as the trends in Fig. 1 suggest), the magnitude of the calculated exposure also varies, hence
we take the log of the final exposure variable in order to harmonise the data. Fig. 8 depicts the distribution of exposure data for
banks with positive exposure to the crisis. Grey bars show the exposure distribution for subsidiary banks in scenario 2 where
the parent banks are located in non-GIIPS countries, while black bars show the distribution for banks in scenario 3 where their
parent banks are located in GIIPS countries. Clearly, banks in scenario 3 tend to have higher exposure than banks in scenario 2,
which suggests that the exposure measurement works well because banks in scenario 3 are expected to be more exposed to the
crisis compared with scenario 2 banks.
Table 1
Sample country, parent banks and subsidiary banks.
Western Europe Eastern Europe
Countries Parent Subsidiary Countries Parent Subsidiary
Andorra 1 2 Albania 1 8
Austria 25 42 Belarus 1 7
Belgium 6 16 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 9
Cyprus 4 7 Bulgaria 1 11
Denmark 12 21 Croatia 1 11
Finland 3 6 Czech Republic 2 9
France 30 91 Estonia 0 4
Germany 35 71 Hungary 2 13
Gibraltar 0 0 Kosovo 0 1
Greece 5 – Latvia 0 9
Iceland 2 1 Lithuania 1 3
Ireland 2 – Macedonia 0 8
Italy 15 – Moldova 0 4
Liechtenstein 1 1 Montenegro 0 3
Luxembourg 7 53 Poland 3 27
Malta 0 2 Romania 1 16
Monaco 1 0 Russia 26 65
Netherlands 11 20 Serbia 0 12
Norway 8 10 Slovakia 0 6
Portugal 3 – Slovenia 2 6
San Marino 0 1 Ukraine 2 22
Spain 3 –
Sweden 7 9
Switzerland 27 46
Turkey 9 7
United Kingdom 21 49
Total 238 455 Total 43 254
Notes: This table shows the sample country for this study and the number of parent banks and subsidiary banks in each country that could be identified
from the database thus included into the ownership network. The categorisation between Eastern and Western European countries is classified by
Bankscope. Initially Bankscope records information for 8872 banks in the sample countries, from which we could only observe shareholder information for
709 subsidiary banks belonging to 281 banking groups. Subsidiary banks in GIIPS countries are not included in the sample since this study focus on
subsidiary banks in non-GIIPS countries only.
4 The trend of the CDS spread for other types of sovereign debts are highly correlated thus we use the CDS spread for 5-year senior debt as the indicator for
the crisis intensity.
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Fig. 9 shows the trends of average loan growth rate for banks in different level of exposure. In our final sample, 525 banks
have no exposure to the crisis, thus these banks are in scenario 1. For positive exposure, 97 banks are categorised into low
exposure group while 85 banks are categorised into high exposure group, based on the exposure data in 2010. As the figure
shows, the lending activity of banks in all 3 types collapsed between 2007 and 2009 due to the global financial crisis, and this
dynamic can be interpreted as a common trend. However, in the year of 2010, which is the first year of the European debt
Table 2
Summary statistics for main variables.
Variable Bank Type Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observation
Bank level
Loan growth Subsidiary 10.70 54.97 100.00 900.00 3001
Parent 10.68 54.56 100.00 796.81 822
Size Subsidiary 14.61 2.17 4.22 21.63 3210
Parent 16.35 2.23 8.65 21.86 955
Deposit Subsidiary 57.57 31.86 0.00 100.00 3004
Parent 53.11 28.20 0.00 100.00 793
Liquidity Subsidiary 28.70 23.33 0.01 100.00 3205
Parent 21.33 17.05 0.00 89.37 909
Capital Subsidiary 11.96 13.36 0.25 100.00 3199
Parent 22.33 28.93 0.00 100.00 944
Interest Margin Subsidiary 3.05 3.76 3.95 61.49 3080
Parent 2.28 3.04 25.20 35.20 862
Profitability Subsidiary 0.31 4.62 94.33 98.21 3195
Parent 0.54 13.62 233.42 35.56 946
Country Level
GDP Growth Host Country 0.77 3.40 17.95 10.20 4235
Home Country 0.47 3.11 14.80 10.20 1672
Unemployment Host Country 8.07 4.72 2.60 47.50 4095
Home Country 7.21 3.29 2.60 27.30 1634
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables that used in our econometric analysis. Bank level data are obtained from Bankscope while
country level data are collected from World Bank. Loan growth is the annual growth rate of gross loans, including net loans and also loan loss reserves. This
variable is used as the performance indicator for bank’s lending activities. Size is log of a bank’s total assets, which is a typical measurement for bank size.
Deposit is a bank’s customer deposit divided by its total assets. Liquidity is a bank’s liquid assets over total assets, while Capital is a bank’s total equity over
total assets. Interest Margin is a bank’s net interest margin indicating the bank’s capability in its core business. Profitability is indicated by bank’s return on
total assets. GDP Growth is the annual growth rate of GDP while Unemployment is the unemployment rate for each country in our sample.
Fig. 8. Exposure distribution. Notes: This figure depicts the distribution of exposure data for banks with positive exposure to the crisis. Grey bars show the
exposure distribution for subsidiary banks in scenario 2 where the parent banks are located in non-GIIPS country, while black bars show the distribution for
banks in scenario 3 where their parent banks are located in GIIPS country. It clearly shows that banks in scenario 3 tend to have higher exposure than banks
in scenario 2, which suggests that the exposure measurement works well since banks in scenario 3 are expected to expose more to the crisis compared with
scenario 2 banks.
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crisis, banks in scenario 1 and banks with lower exposure experienced a strong recovery in their lending growth while highly
exposed banks did not show the same level of recovery. More importantly, the average lending growth rate for banks with
higher exposure continues to drop in 2011 with the further deterioration of the European debt crisis, and there is no sign of
recovery until 2014. Another thing to be noticed here is that though lending growth for both scenario 1 banks and lower
exposed banks has been recovered since 2010, the performance of lower exposed banks is much more volatile than scenario
1 banks’ during the crisis period. This suggests that the stability of banks’ lending activity would also be affected even they
are just marginally exposed to the crisis. We also explored whether the decline in loan growth observed over the sample
period varied at points in the distribution other than the mean, but the decline is at all percentiles.
5. Econometric method
We use the method of difference-in-differences (DID) to identify whether the liquidity crisis in GIIPS country’s banking
system due to the European sovereign debt crisis could be transmitted to other European countries through bank’s cross-
border ownership linkages. A conventional DID setting requires two groups: control group and treatment group; and two
periods: pre-treatment period and post-treatment period. Two dummy variables will be created to indicate whether an
observation gets the treatment or not before and after the implementation of the treatment; and whether this observation
is in pre-treatment period or post-treatment period. It tests the difference in the difference between the treated group and
control group in the two periods. Thus a significant difference in difference would suggest a significant treatment effect.
Specifically, the treated groups in our DID analysis are the non-GIIPS-based banks exposed to the liquidity crisis in a GIIPS
country, due to their ownership linkages with banks in a GIIPS banking system. The control group is represented by banks
without an ownership link with banks in the GIIPS countries (e.g. scenario 1). The year of 2010 is used as the cut-off between
the pre- and post-period, since early 2010 is considered the sating of the debt crisis. In terms of grouping, in the control
group there are 525 (scenario 1), while in the treated sample there are 172 banks with positive exposure (scenario 2 or
3). Note that exposure here is a continuous variable so we can measure the intensity of the shock.
The specifications of the regression model are illustrated by the equations below. We first apply the conventional DID
method to find the treatment effect. As Eq. (1) shows, the DID method is implemented by the interaction term between
bank’s exposure (treatment) and the dummy variable for post-period. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term,
Fig. 9. Trend of loan growth rate, by exposure group. Notes: This figure shows the trends of average loan growth rate for banks with different level of
exposure. In the final sample, 525 banks have 0 exposure to the crisis (scenario 1 banks). For those who have positive exposure, 97 banks are categorised
into low exposure group while 85 banks are categorised into high exposure group, base on the exposure data in 2010. As the figure shows, the lending
activity of banks in all 3 types collapsed between 2007 and 2009 due to the global financial crisis. In 2010, which is the first year of the European debt crisis,
banks in scenario 1 and banks with lower exposure experienced a strong recovery in their lending growth while highly exposed banks did not recover to the
same extent. The average lending growth rate for banks with higher exposure continues to drop in 2011 with the further deterioration of the European debt
crisis, and there is no sign of recovery until 2014. Though lending growth for both scenario 1 banks and lower exposed banks has been recovered since 2010,
the performance of lower exposed banks is much more volatile than scenario 1 banks during the crisis period.
168 Y. Cao et al. / J. Int. Financ. Markets Inst. Money 53 (2018) 158–178
a^2, will examine our hypothesis that the subsidiary banks with higher exposure to the crisis would reduce their lending
growth more than those with lower exposure during the crisis.
DLi;j;t ¼ a1 þ a2Expoj;t  Postt þ
Xm
k¼3
akX i;t þ
Xn
k¼mþ1
akXj;t þ ct þ ci þ ni;j;t ð1Þ
DLi;j;t ¼ b1 þ
Xp
k¼2
bkExpoj;t  Yeart þ
Xq
k¼pþ1
bkX i;t þ
Xs
k¼qþ1
bkXj;t þ ct þ ci þ i;j;t ð2Þ
where i is each subsidiary bank in the sample and j is each parent bank/banking group, t denotes each year in the sample,
ranging from 2008 to 2013. DLi;j;t is loan growth rate of subsidiary bank i in banking group j at time t and Expoj;t is banking
group j’s exposure to the crisis at time t. Postt is a dummy variable for post-period which takes value 1 if the time is in
between 2010 and 2013; otherwise 0. Yeart is a set of time dummy variables, which indicate each year in the sample, ranging
from 2008 to 2013; Xi;t is a set of control variables for subsidiary bank i at time t. Xj;t is a set of control variables for parent
bank j at time t and ct is a set of time dummy variables controlling for year effect. ci controls for bank level fixed effects for
subsidiary bank i. ni;j;t is the error term for bank i in group j at time t.
Our analysis also applies the dynamic DID method in the robustness check section. The conventional DID with two peri-
ods can only identify whether the treatment has a effect in the post period, while the dynamic DID allows us to see the
impact of treatment as it evolves over the years in the post period. In other words, the advantage of dynamic DID method
is that it is able to show when the treatment becomes effective and when the effect dies out. As Eq. (2) shows, the dynamic
DIDmethod is implemented by introducing a interaction term between bank’s exposure and year dummy variables. The esti-
mated coefficient on this term shows the effect of a bank’s exposure on bank lending activity in each year over the sample
period. Moreover the assumption of common trends before the shock can be inspected.
The dependent variable, Loan growth, is the annual growth rate of gross loans, including net loans and also loan loss
reserves. As suggested by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), it captures the changes in loan that is due to changes in loan
loss provisions. This variable is used as the performance indicator for bank’s lending activities. Finally, we include the fol-
lowing variables to control for both subsidiary and parent characteristics. Size is log of a bank’s total assets, which is a typical
measurement for bank size. Deposit is a bank’s customer deposit divided by its total assets. This variable indicates bank’s
funding stability by capturing to what extent the bank is funded by stable customer deposits. Liquidity is a bank’s liquid
assets over total assets, while Capital is a bank’s total equity over total assets. Liquidity and Capitalmeasure a bank’s risk aver-
sion and solvency. A higher liquidity/capital ratio indicates that the bank is taking less risk and is more solvent. Interest Mar-
gin is a bank’s net interest margin indicating the bank’s capability in its core business. Profitability is indicated by bank’s
return on total assets. Summary statistics for the variables is presented in Table 2.
6. Empirical results
6.1. Baseline result
The baseline results of this study are presented in Table 3. Columns (1)–(3) show the results from the conventional DID
regressions. In the first specification we do not include any control variables while the second and third specifications
include controls for the subsidiary’s characteristics and for the parent’s characteristics respectively. The number of observa-
tions decreases as we include more control variables into the model. The estimated coefficient on Exposure is positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that banks with higher exposure tend to have a higher lending growth rate during the
whole sample period. However, this effect is not significant once we control for the characteristics of subsidiary or parent
banks, as shown in columns (2) and (3). Post dummy has a negative coefficient, indicating that the lending activity of all
banks are negatively affected during the crisis, though again it is not significant once we include control variables for both
subsidiary and parent banks. The interaction between Exposure and Post dummy is the key term in the conventional DID
regressions and the estimated coefficient on this term shows the main result of our study. The coefficient is negative and
statistically significant and is consistent across the each specification. Taking the estimate from column (3) as an example,
the estimated coefficient implies that if a bank’s exposure increases by 1 percent, the bank’s lending growth rate would
decrease by 5.756 percentage points. The subsidiary bank’s exposure is calculated based on the bank’s ownership linkages
with banks located in GIIPS country where there is a liquidity crisis, thus it captures to what extent the subsidiary bank is
exposed to the crisis due to its ownership ties. The regression results then show that the ownership linkages between banks
in GIIPS country and bank in Non-GIIPS EU countries transmit the liquidity crisis. In other words, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS country was transmitted to other European countries through bank ownership
networks.
Our estimates include a rich set of control variables. These are presented in the second and third columns of Table 3. They
show that the size of a subsidiary bank is positively and significantly related to the bank’s lending growth rate, and the effect
is large: if the size of the subsidiary bank increases by 1 percent, its lending growth rate would be 21.9 percentage points
higher on average during the sample period; bank liquidity is negatively related with the loan growth rate and this effect
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is also significant: a 1 percentage point increase in a bank’s liquid assets reduce its loan growth rate by 1.4 percentage points;
however, subsidiary bank’s deposit, capital and profitability are not significantly related with a bank’s lending activity during
our sample period. Apart from bank level controls, host country’s characteristics controlling for country-level demand-
effects also have significant effects on bank performance. As to be expected, the subsidiary bank’s lending growth is posi-
tively related with the host country’s GDP growth while negatively related with the unemployment rate. This suggests that
the subsidiary banks expand their credit supply faster in those countries where the economy is growing.
The parent bank’s characteristics are also important for the subsidiary’s lending activity, as suggested by the internal mar-
ket hypothesis. As the third panel of Table 3 shows, the interest margin of parent bank is the only significant factor. Contrary
to the findings by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), a parent bank’s interest margin is negatively related with tis subsidiary’s
lending growth. Since interest margin captures a bank’s capability in its core business, this result suggests that the sub-
sidiaries of parent banks with better performance tend to have a lower lending growth rate during the sample period. How-
ever, this could be explained by the internal capital market hypothesis that if the parent bank observe better investment
opportunities in the home country, then they would focus more on its own market rather than support its subsidiary banks
abroad, thus the foreign subsidiaries would have relatively lower lending growth rates. Besides, the control variables for
home country characteristics have no significant effect on a subsidiary bank’s lending growth.
Table 3
Baseline results.
Dependent variable Diff-in-Diff
Loan growth (1) (2) (3)
Exposure 5.325⁄⁄ 3.083 7.108
(2.100) (2.257) (4.794)
Post 12.918⁄⁄⁄ 7.701⁄ 5.017
(2.767) (4.323) (6.730)
Exposure⁄Post 5.189⁄⁄⁄ 3.920⁄⁄ 5.756⁄⁄
(1.476) (1.590) (2.354)
Subsidiary Characteristics
Size 14.546⁄⁄ 21.892⁄⁄
(6.439) (10.901)
Deposit 0.109 0.048
(0.161) (0.326)
Capital 0.420 0.527
(0.533) (0.633)
Profitability 2.779 3.543
(2.623) (3.248)
Liquidity 0.971⁄⁄⁄ 1.404⁄⁄⁄
(0.245) (0.434)
Parent Characteristics
Size 8.077
(9.466)
Capital 0.163
(0.321)
Profitability 0.195
(0.319)
Liquidity 0.188
(0.154)
Interest Margin 2.301⁄
(1.262)
Constant 18.835⁄⁄⁄ 149.046 85.719
(2.252) (97.619) (191.716)
Observations 3001 2736 1616
No. of banks 638 590 393
R2 0.030 0.108 0.158
Notes: This table presents the Baseline results of this study, where the dependent variable is the
annual growth rate of gross loans. Year fixed effect and bank level fixed effect are controlled in
each regression. We do not include any control variables in the first regression while the second
regression includes controls for subsidiary’s characteristics and then in the third regression we
further include controls for parent’s characteristics (GDP growth and Unemployment rate are also
included in the regressions). Size is log of a bank’s total assets. Deposit is a bank’s customer deposit
divided by its total assets. Liquidity is a bank’s liquid assets over total assets, while Capital is a
bank’s total equity over total assets. Interest Margin is a bank’s net interest margin indicating the
bank’s capability in its core business. Profitability is indicated by bank’s return on total assets. The
interaction between Exposure and Post dummy is the key term in the conventional DID analysis.
Overall, the estimates from the conventional DID method suggest that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS
countries were transmitted to other European countries though bank’s cross-border ownership
linkages. Significance levels: ⁄ p < 0:1, ⁄⁄ p < 0:05, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0:01.
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In the appendix we explore the heterogeneity of the effect by both subsidiary and parent bank’s characteristics. In terms
of subsidiary bank’s characteristics, we find that small banks, banks with lower profitability, and banks with higher capital
ratio are more likely to be affected by a foreign liquidity shock. In terms of parent bank’s characteristics, we find that if the
parent bank is more risk-averse, less capable in its core business, or has higher profitability liquidity shocks are more likely
to spillover to foreign countries.5
6.2. Subsidiary location: west vs. east
In this section, we separate the sample according to the subsidiary bank’s location to explore the difference between the
subsidiaries banks located in Western European countries and those in Eastern European countries. By doing this, we would
like to observe whether the strength of the crisis transmission is contingent on the operating country of the subsidiary bank.
In particular, are foreign banks in developing economies less resilient to an external liquidity shock than those foreign banks
in developed economies?
As Table 4 shows, the estimates on the interaction term are statistically significant without parent bank controls, and the
size of the negative effect is similar for subsidiary banks located in bothWestern and Eastern Europe. However, once we con-
trol for parent characteristics in Columns (3) and (6), a relatively greater negative effect is estimated for Eastern European
banks while the interaction term is not statistically significant for banks located in Western European countries.
This result suggests that banks located in developing countries (Eastern Europe) are more fragile when facing an external
shock, compared with banks located in developed countries (Western Europe). One possible explanation is that subsidiary
banks operating in developing countries are more dependent on their parent banks’ liquidity support, as the financial sector
is usually less developed in developing countries. For banks operating in a developed financial system, they would have
easier access to alternative funding even if their parent banks or the banking group as a whole are suffering from a liquidity
shock. One policy implication can be drawn here. Regulatory authorities in developing countries might wish to target liquid-
ity regulation specifically at foreign subsidiary banks operating in their domestic banking sector. This could be justified if, as
suspected, a higher dependency on parent bank funding harms the stability of the domestic banking system should an exter-
nal liquidity shock occur.
6.3. Parent location: scenario 2 vs. scenario 3
This section explores the heterogeneity in terms of parent banks’ location. We divide our sample according to the three
possible scenarios for the subsidiary banks.6 Notice that subsidiary banks in scenario 1 are always included in the sub-sample
as they are the control group in our DID regression. Results are presented in Table 5. It shows that the negative and significant
result is mainly driven by subsidiary bank in scenario 3, as the estimates for scenario 2 banks are consistently insignificant. This
implies that subsidiary banks located in non-GIIPS countries that are indirectly exposed to the crisis were not significantly
affected by the external liquidity shock, suggesting that the parent bank could act as a buffer which could isolate external
shocks and stop the crisis transmission.
This analysis also presents an implication for policy makers. The performance of the foreign banks in domestic banking
system are increasingly important, particularly in developing economies. Therefore, as argued above, it could be necessary
for the regulatory authorities to monitor a foreign bank’s parent bank and the economic and financial situation in its home
country. In addition, our analysis in this section suggests that it is not so necessary to supervise the parent bank’s operations
in other countries, apart from its home country, as a liquidity shock received by a subsidiary bank in other countries would
be isolated by the parent bank. Hence the shock would be less likely to affect the domestic banking system.
6.4. Network distance to the crisis: Level 1 vs. Level 2+ subsidiaries
As the bank ownership network is constructed based on the banks’ direct ownership linkages, it allows us to observe the
position of a single subsidiary bank in the network hierarchy. Given this feature of our data, we are able to explore the
heterogeneity in the banks’ ‘network distance’ to the crisis. In other words, we test how far the liquidity crisis can be trans-
mitted through the bank ownership network.
We define a Level 1 connection as the connection between the parent bank and its immediate subsidiary bank, while a
Level 2 connection is the connection through which the parent bank owns the subsidiary bank’s subsidiaries. In this case, the
network distance between Level 2+ banks and the parent bank is longer than Level 1 banks. As the crisis would be transmit-
ted from the parent bank to the subsidiary banks in the sample, Level 1 bank are at the front line of the ownership network
5 Additionally, we explored whether differences emerge between nearly wholly subsidiaries (90–100% ownership) and majority owned subsidiaries (50–90%
ownership). Splitting the sample at this cut-off did not reveal differences between these entities and the results of this exercise are available on request.
6 As mentioned in Section 3, there are three possible scenarios of the bank ownership network in our empirical setting. Scenario 1 is the case where both the
parent and subsidiary banks are located in non-GIIPS countries, thus they have no exposure to the crisis. In scenario 2, certain subsidiary banks from a banking
group are located in GIIPS countries, thus their peer subsidiary banks located in non-GIIPS countries are indirectly exposed to the crisis due to the ownership
linkages. Scenario 3 is where the parent bank of a banking group is located in the GIIPS countries, thus subsidiary banks in this banking group are highly
exposed to the crisis, though they are located in Non-GIIPS countries.
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facing the crisis, while Level 2+ banks are farer from the crisis in the network. The regression results in Table 6 show that the
estimated coefficients on the DID term are consistently statistically significant for Level 1 banks across different models
while for Level 2 banks the coefficients are not consistently significant at conventional levels. This implies that the bank
ownership network could act as a liquidity crisis transmission while its power would be limited to the Level 1 connections,
as the negative effect on Level 2+ banks is weaker. 7
7. Robustness checks
7.1. Dynamic difference-in-difference
In this section we estimate the dynamic DID method to examine our hypothesis; results are presented in Table 7. The
estimated coefficient on Exposure is still positive and statistically significant; this is consistent with the estimates from
Table 4
Subsidiary location: west vs east.
Dependent variable West European banks East European banks
Loan growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 5.732⁄⁄ 4.24 5.284 5.258⁄ 1.889 9.576
2.883 2.853 4.228 2.883 3.481 9.101
Post 7.264⁄⁄ 8.596⁄⁄ 10.393 22.535⁄⁄⁄ 7.742 0.751
2.898 4.323 6.324 5.878 11.339 14.118
Exposure⁄Post 4.569⁄⁄ 4.184⁄ 3.023 5.966⁄⁄⁄ 4.465⁄⁄ 10.210⁄⁄⁄
2.298 2.301 2.29 1.885 2.087 3.740
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1913 1764 932 1088 972 684
No. of banks 393 367 224 245 223 169
R2 0.03 0.067 0.124 0.057 0.213 0.252
Notes: This table shows the results for bank heterogeneity in terms of the bank’s location. Refer to Table 3 for full specifications. The estimates on the
interaction term are consistently significant without parent bank controls, and the size of the negative effect are similar for subsidiary banks located in both
Western and Eastern Europe. However, once we control for parent characteristics in Column (3) and (6), a relatively greater negative effect is estimated for
Eastern European banks while the interaction term is not statistically significant for banks located in Western European countries. Significance levels:
⁄ p < 0:1, ⁄⁄ p < 0:05, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0:01.
Table 5
Parent location: scenario 2 vs scenario 3.
Dependent variable Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Loan growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 0.593 0.161 3.37 5.963⁄⁄⁄ 3.341 17.260⁄⁄
2.379 3.013 8.333 2.195 2.656 7.04
Post 12.530⁄⁄⁄ 6.692 5.18 14.105⁄⁄⁄ 10.282⁄⁄ 8.674
2.87 4.519 7.597 2.959 4.755 7.665
Exposure⁄Post 0.891 1.12 1.063 5.541⁄⁄⁄ 4.011⁄⁄ 8.886⁄⁄⁄
1.956 2.321 4.582 1.606 1.853 2.935
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2655 2403 1336 2579 2342 1256
No. of banks 566 523 334 550 506 314
R2 0.02 0.11 0.154 0.031 0.116 0.193
Notes: This table presents results for the Scenario test. Refer to Table 3 for full specifications. In scenario 2 the parent bank of a banking group is located in
non-GIIPS countries, and subsidiary banks in non-GIIPS countries are indirectly exposed to the crisis; while in scenario 3 the parent bank is located in GIIPS
countries thus the subsidiary banks are directly exposed to the crisis. It shows that the negative and significant result is mainly driven by subsidiary bank in
scenario 3, as the estimates for scenario 2 banks are consistently insignificant. This implies that subsidiary banks located in non-GIIPS countries that are
indirectly exposed to the crisis were not significantly affected by the external liquidity shock, as the parent bank could act as a buffer which could isolate
external shocks and stop the crisis transmission. Significance levels: ⁄ p < 0:1, ⁄⁄ p < 0:05, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0:01.
7 This result implies that subsidiary banks can also act as a buffer thus alleviating the liquidity shock within the network, and stop the crisis being
transmitted further. This is consistent with the implication from our previous analysis on banks in different scenarios. Both analyses could help policy makers
to consider the extent to which the foreign banks and their parent banks need to be supervised and regulated.
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the conventional DID regressions. The key terms in these regressions are the interactions between Exposure and year dummy
variables, rather than the Post dummy variables in the conventional DID method. The interaction with the dummy variable
for the year of 2008 is the omitted base year. As Table 7 shows, the estimated coefficients on the interactions between Expo-
sure and dummy for the year 2009 are negative but not statistically significant, which suggests that the difference in lending
growth between highly exposed banks and less exposed banks in the year of 2009 are not statistically different from the year
of 2008. This implies that there is a common trend between bank’s lending activity over the pre-crisis period, which satisfies
one of the key assumptions of the DID approach. Then, the interaction terms become significant starting from the year of
2010 which is the first year of the crisis. As column (1) shows, the estimates on interaction terms for each year in the crisis
period are negative and significant and the size of the effect is considerable, suggesting that bank’s exposure has a long-term
negative effect on bank’s lending activity. However, once we include subsidiary bank’s characteristics as control variables in
column (2), both the significance and size of the interaction estimates decrease, especially for the years of 2012 and 2013.
Moreover, as column (3) results show, once we add parent bank’s characteristics into the regression, the significance drops
further, and the negative number for the year of 2013 is no longer significant. Overall this implies that bank’s exposure has a
pronounced effect during the crisis period (2010–2012), but it reverts back to the mean in 2013.
Another implication from the dynamic DID analysis is that the magnitude of the negative effect of bank’s exposure
reaches its highest level in 2011, when the GIIPS sovereign debt crisis also peaked, as suggested by Fig. 1. This trend is con-
sistently predicted by all three models. Looking at column (3), for instance, banks with 1 percent higher exposure would
reduce their lending growth rate by 6.51 percentage points in the year of 2010, while in 2011 these banks would reduce
lending growth rate by 7.9 percentage points, compared with the lending growth rate in the base year, 2008. In 2012, the
negative effect of exposure on loan growth rate reduces to 6.59 percentage points, and it is only significant at 10 percent
level. This effect drops further in the year of 2013, and becomes no longer significant.
7.2. Dynamic ownership network
The baseline results of our analysis are estimated based on a static bank ownership network, which is constructed with
bank ownership data in December 2010. Throughout the analysis we assume that the ownership network did not change
over the sample period. However, the networks may have changed over the crisis period.8
In this section, we conduct the DID analysis based on a dynamic ownership network as a robustness check for our baseline
result. The dynamic ownership network is constructed year by year using the time varying ownership data. The regression
results are presented in Table 8. It reveals that the estimated coefficient on the key terms are qualitatively the same as the
baseline results. Overall, the robustness checks confirm our baseline results that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries were
transmitted to other European countries through bank’s cross-border ownership linkages.9
Table 6
Network distance to the crisis: Level 1 vs Level 2+ connections.
Dependent variable Level 1 Connection Level 2+ Connection
Loan growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 8.876⁄⁄⁄ 4.652 11.290⁄⁄ 5.214 0.275 7.556
3.287 5.087 4.841 3.594 2.828 10.996
Post 13.872⁄⁄⁄ 8.222⁄ 5.526 7.883 10.38 10.042
3.018 4.372 6.825 7.018 11.615 24.2
Exposure⁄Post 5.850⁄⁄⁄ 3.872⁄ 5.583⁄⁄ 6.707⁄ 3.684 16.874⁄
1.649 2.237 2.421 3.524 2.826 8.892
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2285 2091 1286 716 645 330
No. of banks 566 523 334 550 506 314
R2 0.032 0.162 0.215 0.039 0.109 0.267
Notes: This table shows regression results for the heterogeneity test in banks’ network distance to the crisis. Refer to Table 3 for full specifications. Level 1
connection is the connection between the parent bank and its immediate subsidiary bank, while Level 2 connection is the connection through which the
parent bank owns the subsidiary bank’s subsidiaries. In this case, the network distance between Level 2+ banks and the parent bank is longer than Level 1
banks. As the crisis would be transmitted from the parent bank to the subsidiary banks in the sample, Level 1 bank are at the front line of the ownership
network facing the crisis, while Level 2+ banks are farer from the crisis in the network. The estimated coefficients on the interaction term are consistently
significant for Level 1 banks across different models while for Level 2 banks the coefficients are estimated less significant. It implies that the bank ownership
network could act as a liquidity crisis transmission while its power would be limited to the Level 1 connections. Significance levels: ⁄ p < 0:1, ⁄⁄ p < 0:05,
⁄⁄⁄ p < 0:01.
8 The reason why we initially focused on a static network is that the direct ownership data in Bankscope is not consistently recorded for bank in each year.
Some ownership linkages are not recorded in a specific year while they appear in later periods. In this case, a dynamic network may suffer from the problem of
inconsistency.
9 Further robustness checks were performed in relation to the timing of the liquidity crisis. For example, since the crisis arrived later in Italy and Portugal
than Greece, Ireland and Spain, we recoded the post-period to reflect this. Our results were unaffected and the results of these checks are available on request.
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Table 7
Robustness checks: dynamic difference-in-difference.
Dependent variable Dynamic DID
Loan growth (1) (2) (3)
Exposure 6.873⁄⁄⁄ 4.611⁄ 8.428
(2.558) (2.682) (5.401)
Exposure⁄2009 2.977 3.391 3.117
(2.319) (2.455) (2.387)
Exposure⁄2010 5.787⁄⁄ 4.989⁄⁄ 6.512⁄⁄
(2.294) (2.304) (3.027)
Exposure⁄2011 7.635⁄⁄⁄ 6.350⁄⁄⁄ 7.922⁄⁄
(2.167) (2.180) (3.129)
Exposure⁄2012 6.117⁄⁄⁄ 4.820⁄⁄ 6.592⁄
(2.145) (2.200) (3.581)
Exposure⁄2013 6.663⁄⁄⁄ 5.563⁄⁄ 5.714
(2.027) (2.158) (3.791)
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3001 2736 1616
No. of banks 638 590 393
R2 0.032 0.11 0.16
Notes: This table shows the robustness check for our baseline result with a dynamic DID
setting. Refer to Table 3 for full specifications. Year effect and bank level fixed effect are
controlled in each regression. We do not include any control variables in the first
regression while the second regression includes controls for subsidiary’s characteristics
and then in the third regression we further include controls for parent’s characteristics.
The number of observations decreases as we include more control variables into the
model due to data availability. The interactions between Exposure and year dummy
variables are the key term in the dynamic DID regressions. Overall, the estimates from the
dynamic DID approach are consistent with the findings from the conventional DID
method that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries were transmitted to other European
countries though bank’s cross-border ownership linkages. What is more, the dynamic
DID regressions show that the transmission effect is most effective in 2011 when the
GIIPS crisis reach the peak, and it dies out in the year of 2013 as the crisis is mitigated in
most GIIPS countries. Significance levels: ⁄ p < 0:1, ⁄⁄ p < 0:05, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0:01.
Table 8
Robustness check: dynamic ownership network.
Dependent variable Conventional DID
Loan growth (1) (2) (3)
Exposure 2.461 0.84 1.94
(1.736) (1.878) (2.716)
Post 11.940⁄⁄⁄ 9.876⁄⁄ 12.476⁄⁄
(3.066) (4.073) (4.905)
Exposure⁄Post 4.617⁄⁄⁄ 3.385⁄⁄ 3.829⁄⁄
(1.491) (1.564) (1.725)
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2753 2519 1899
No. of banks 575 531 462
R2 0.029 0.08 0.11
Notes: This table shows the robustness check for our baseline result
with a dynamic ownership network, which is constructed year by
year using the time varying ownership data. Refer to Table 3 for full
specifications. The estimated coefficient on the key terms are quali-
tatively the same with the baseline results. Significance levels:
⁄ p < 0:1, ⁄⁄ p < 0:05, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0:01.
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8. Conclusion
Over the past two decades, the world’s economies are increasingly interconnected through bank ownership ties. There
has been a substantial increase in foreign bank ownership in the domestic banking system. As such, it is important to under-
stand the possible consequences of the interconnectedness of the global banking system. It has been argued that the pres-
ence of foreign banks can stimulate competition and innovation in domestic banking system thus improving the overall
efficiency of the financial sector. This should have a long-term positive effect on the development of the domestic economy.
However, a large proportion of foreign owned banks could expose the domestic baking system to international liquidity
crises. This paper examined whether a liquidity crisis can be transmitted internationally through a bank’s cross-border own-
ership linkages.
The 2010 European debt crisis provided a unique opportunity to identify this transmission. The ownership network for
international banks operating in the European countries was constructed, based on the ownership data provided by Bank-
scope. Then the exposure to the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries was calculated for each subsidiary bank located in non-
GIIPS countries, measured by the proportion of their banking groups’ assets in GIIPS countries. The Difference-in-
Difference method was implemented to examine the transmission effect. The results from the DID regressions show that
the treatment has a negative and significant effect on a bank’s lending growth rate during the crisis period, and the magni-
tude of the effect is large. Overall the results of this study suggest that subsidiary banks operating in non-GIIPS countries who
were exposed to the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries due to the ownership linkages tend to have a lower lending growth
rate during the crisis period, compared with those who were not exposed. This, in turn, suggests that the liquidity crisis
in GIIPS countries banking system was transmitted to other European countries through cross-border bank ownership
linkages.
Our study also presents opportunities for future work. While our data has allowed us to identify ownership ties, given the
relatively small number of observations within GIIPS countries and incomplete information on changes in ownership over
time we have been unable to test the ‘support effect’ of the internal capital market. The ‘support effect’ is the notion that
subsidiary banks suffering liquidity shock in GIIPS countries could be supported by their owners located outside of GIIPS
countries.
An important caveat to our findings is that we are unable to fully capture the banks’ exposure to government bonds.
While we can control for the bank-specific time-invariant levels of exposure through a bank-fixed effect, it is not possible
with our current data to control for the time-varying exposure to GIIPS debts.
Our analysis has implications for policy in terms of the regulation of international banks. First, as a liquidity shock can be
transmitted through cross-border bank ownership linkages, regulatory authorities across countries might to think carefully
about the activities of international banks and whether any of these should be ring fenced. Specific policies targeted at inter-
national banks so as to isolate foreign liquidity shocks could help support the stability of a domestic banking system. While
such regulation may come at an operational cost for the banks involved, this has to be balanced against the need for a stable
financial system. Second, the paper provides empirical evidence for operation of the internal capital market within banking
groups in which international banks allocate their banking assets in order to maximise the profits. Regulators across coun-
tries would do better to coordinate their activities and agree policy on an international rather than domestic level. This may
help alleviate the potential for contagion across an international bank’s internal capital market.
Appendix A. Bank heterogeneity
The main results suggest that the liquidity crisis in GIIPS countries’ was transmitted to other European countries through
the banks’ cross-border ownership linkages. In this section, we try to disentangle the transmission effect by looking at bank
heterogeneity. In other words, we examine which characteristics of the banks could help subsidiary banks to be more resi-
lient to external liquidity shocks, and which characteristics could instead intensify the propagation of the shock.
To do this, the sample is evenly divided into 3 sub-samples according to different levels of a bank’s pre-crisis balance
sheet structure as of 2009. For example, in terms of the size of the subsidiary banks measured by log of total assets, the level
I sub-sample only includes small banks in the initial sample, while big banks are categorised into the level III sub-sample,
leaving banks in level II of the sub-sample as medium sized. Then the DID method is implemented with the same estimating
specifications for the sub-samples separately to show whether the transmission effect varies with the size of the subsidiary
banks.
A.1. Subsidiary characteristics
We first explore the heterogeneity in the subsidiary banks’ characteristics. Table A1 presents results from the DID regres-
sions. Six types of subsidiary bank features are tested: size, deposit, profitability, capital, liquidity and interest margin. The
interaction between bank’s exposure and Post dummy variable is the key variable of interest in these regressions.
The bank size test shows that smaller banks are more vulnerable to the external liquidity shock if the subsidiary bank is
highly exposed, since the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is only significant for banks in level I sub-sample. This
could be due to the fact that smaller banks do not have access to various alternative funding sources, and hence would be
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more reliant on the funding from their parent bank. As a result, a liquidity shock received by the parent bank in the home
country could be directly transmitted to smaller subsidiary banks. Larger subsidiary banks (banks with more assets) have
easier access to alternative liquidity support (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
We then test the influence of a bank’s deposit funding on the transmission effect. Previous empirical work by Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2010) suggests that a bank’s lending activity would be more resilient during the global financial crisis if the
banks had better access to deposit financing and less reliant on other forms of short-term debt. Thus it is expected that
the transmission effect would be alleviated if the subsidiary banks relies more on deposit funding. However, we found weak
evidence for this argument. As the table shows, the interaction term is only significant for banks in level II sub-sample, but
not significant for level I or level III banks, though the coefficients are all estimated to be negative. This suggests that there is
no clear trend that banks with more deposit funding would be more resilient to external liquidity shocks.
In terms of bank’s profitability, panel three shows that the interaction term is negative and significant if the bank has a
lower ROA (level I), while it is not significant for level III banks where banks’ ROA are relatively higher. Though the interac-
tion term is also marginally significant for level II banks, there is still evidence that higher profitability would alleviate the
external liquidity shock that transmitted from foreign parent banks to domestic subsidiaries.
Bank capital and liquidity are tested as a measurement for a bank’s risk aversion that could have a negative effect on a
bank’s loan growth performance; or as a indicator for a bank’s capital or liquidity constraints to expand their loan business
Table A1
Heterogeneity in Subsidiary’s Characteristics.
Dependent variable Level I Level II Level III
Loan growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size
Exposure⁄Post 9.618⁄ 12.343⁄ 2.558 2.142 0.485 0.331
(5.029) (6.421) (2.169) (2.650) (1.191) (1.848)
Observations 768 484 943 574 921 505
No. of banks 176 125 179 127 171 104
R2 0.132 0.235 0.162 0.217 0.241 0.246
Deposit
Exposure⁄Post 2.090 0.681 8.755⁄⁄⁄ 7.386⁄ 3.043 1.837
(2.100) (5.386) (2.918) (3.869) (2.475) (2.718)
Observations 768 484 943 574 921 505
No. of banks 174 109 173 115 173 130
R2 0.256 0.361 0.158 0.226 0.058 0.150
Profitability
Exposure⁄Post 10.158⁄⁄ 7.825 3.774⁄ 4.735 0.086 1.570
(4.607) (4.917) (2.059) (3.244) (1.620) (3.011)
Observations 909 532 912 516 808 532
No. of banks 183 126 175 116 167 112
R2 0.112 0.155 0.146 0.205 0.240 0.215
Capital
Exposure⁄Post 0.257 0.817 6.259⁄ 2.157 4.839⁄⁄ 11.265⁄⁄
(1.730) (2.892) (3.317) (2.205) (2.271) (5.233)
Observations 876 502 924 547 832 514
No. of banks 168 109 179 122 179 125
R2 0.126 0.186 0.090 0.259 0.168 0.244
Liquidity
Exposure⁄Post 0.900 0.473 4.628⁄⁄ 8.435⁄⁄ 6.634 4.824
(1.279) (2.156) (2.277) (4.146) (4.499) (4.426)
Observations 873 520 930 591 829 452
No. of banks 169 111 181 130 176 115
R2 0.266 0.305 0.151 0.198 0.115 0.208
Interest Margin
Exposure⁄Post 7.797 13.763⁄⁄⁄ 1.419 0.018 3.399 7.945⁄⁄
(4.724) (5.210) (1.744) (2.645) (2.160) (3.701)
Observations 789 377 917 594 836 557
No. of banks 159 91 176 131 174 126
R2 0.097 0.237 0.130 0.221 0.240 0.322
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents test results for heterogeneity in subsidiary bank’s characteristics. Year fixed effect and bank level fixed effect are controlled in
each regression. Refer to Table 3 for full specifications. It shows that smaller bank is more vulnerable to the external liquidity shock if the subsidiary bank is
highly exposed; that higher profitability would alleviate the external liquidity shock that transmitted from foreign parent banks to domestic subsidiaries;
that bank with more capital would be more cautious on expanding their credit during the crisis period; that there is trend that banks with more liquid
assets would reduce their lending growth more during the crisis; and that there is no clear evidence suggesting that bank’s interest margin would affect
subsidiary banks lending activities during the crisis period. Significance levels: ⁄ p < 0:1, ⁄⁄ p < 0:05, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0:01.
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thus could also be positively related with a bank’s lending activity. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) show that subsidiary
banks’ capital and liquidity conditions are negatively related with their lending growth, suggesting that subsidiary banks
with higher capital ratios and more liquid assets would be more risk-averse thus tend to have a lower lending growth rate.
Moreover, Black and Strahan (2002) suggest that less capitalised subsidiary banks are more likely to expand credit quickly
due to moral hazard. Our tests would show the effect of bank capital and liquid assets on a bank’s lending growth when their
parent bank is suffering from a liquidity crisis.
As the table shows, the interaction term is only significant for the level III sample where banks are better capitalised,
while for less capitalised banks in level I the effect is estimated as small and insignificant. This implies that a bank with more
capital would be more cautious on expanding their credit during the crisis period. In terms of a bank’s liquidity condition, the
effect is similar with bank capital. It shows that the interaction term is only significant for level II banks with a medium level
of liquid assets, while it is not significant for banks in levels I and III. However, if we compare the estimated coefficient for
level I and level III banks, there is a very clear trend that banks with more liquid assets would reduce their lending growth
more during the crisis. These findings show that a liquidity crisis in a home country could intensify a subsidiary bank’s moral
hazard problem.
We also test the influence of a bank’s interest margin, which reflects a bank’s capability in their core business. However,
there is no clear evidence suggesting that these factors would affect subsidiary banks lending activities during the crisis per-
iod. Thus the transmission effect of ownership linkages is not likely to be affected by this characteristic of the subsidiary bank.
A.2. Parent characteristics
We repeat the analysis above by considering the parent banks’ characteristics. The liquidity shock in home country is
transmitted from parent banks to subsidiary banks located in the host countries thus it is reasonable to test whether parent
banks’ characteristics would affect the transmission effect, as the internal capital market hypothesis suggests. We test four
types of parent banks’ characteristics: profitability, capital, liquidity and interest margin. Table A2 presents the results for the
heterogeneity tests.
Table A2
Heterogeneity in parent’s characteristics.
Dependent variable Level I Level II Level III
Loan growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profitability
Exposure⁄Post 0.440 9.760 5.065 4.583 11.671⁄⁄ 10.111⁄⁄
(1.548) (9.740) (3.187) (2.786) (5.267) (4.887)
Observations 642 468 634 605 542 483
Number of Banks 135 117 134 132 121 112
R2 0.098 0.170 0.292 0.308 0.149 0.176
Capital
Exposure⁄Post 1.528 0.974 3.420 6.143 22.717⁄⁄⁄ 24.039⁄⁄⁄
(2.773) (2.880) (2.257) (3.961) (7.455) (9.070)
Observations 619 600 682 642 519 314
Number of Banks 137 134 145 142 109 85
R2 0.163 0.155 0.215 0.258 0.195 0.336
Liquidity
Exposure⁄Post 0.040 1.562 4.161 5.868 4.267⁄ 6.917⁄
(1.510) (1.738) (3.892) (6.216) (2.506) (3.714)
Observations 573 433 608 569 584 551
Number of Banks 120 109 135 131 124 120
R2 0.202 0.224 0.167 0.197 0.217 0.284
Interest Margin
Exposure⁄Post 4.766⁄ 11.053⁄⁄⁄ 0.092 4.812 6.325 1.783
(2.870) (3.988) (2.402) (4.554) (7.766) (3.542)
Observations 590 533 559 539 559 483
Number of Banks 126 120 118 117 125 123
R2 0.179 0.250 0.118 0.168 0.252 0.283
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the test results for the heterogeneity in parent bank’s characteristics. Year fixed effect and bank level fixed effect are controlled in
each regression. Refer to Table 3 for full specifications. The test for parent bank’s profitability suggests that if the ROA of parent bank is higher then its
foreign subsidiary banks tend to have a lower lending growth during crisis period. Capital test shows that if the parent bank is better capitalised then the
liquidity shock would be more likely to transmit to its foreign subsidiary banks. Parent bank’s liquidity condition is also negatively related with subsidiary
bank’s lending growth during the crisis period. The interest margin test suggests that subsidiary banks’ lending activity would be significantly affected
during the crisis period if their parent bank have a low interest margin, while the negative effect is not significant for subsidiary banks with a parent bank
that has higher interest margin. Overall, the analysis on the heterogeneity in parent bank’s characteristics provide evidence for internal capital market
hypothesis. Significance levels: ⁄ p < 0:1, ⁄⁄ p < 0:05, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0:01.
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The test for parent banks’ profitability shows that the interaction term is only significant in the level III sample where the
parent banks have a better profitability. This suggests that if the ROA of the parent bank is higher then its foreign subsidiary,
the bank tends to have a lower lending growth during crisis period. A higher profit of a bank may due to higher risks which
may be adversely affected during the liquidity crisis. As a result, the bank’s foreign subsidiaries may also be affected as they
may highly rely on funding from their internal capital market.
We explore the effect of a parent bank’s capital and liquidity. The results in Table A2 show that if the parent bank is better
capitalised then the liquidity shock would be more likely to transmit to its foreign subsidiary banks, since the interaction
term is only significant for the sample of level III. The parent bank’s liquidity condition is also negatively related to the sub-
sidiary bank’s lending growth during the crisis period. Again, this could be due to the fact that better capitalised banks and
banks with more liquid assets are more risk-averse, thus these banks tend to cut funding support towards their foreign sub-
sidiary banks during the crisis period. Another explanation is that the moral hazard problem is amplified due to the liquidity
crisis, thus less capitalised banks and banks with less liquid assets tend to take more risk to expand their credit by supporting
foreign subsidiary banks.
Finally, we test whether the transmission effect could be affected by the capability of parent banks in the core business,
which is indicated by the bank’s interest margin. The interest margin test shows that the interaction term is only significant
for the level I sample where the parent bank has a lower interest margin. This suggests that subsidiary banks’ lending activity
would be significantly affected during the crisis period if their parent bank has a low interest margin, while the negative
effect is not significant for subsidiary banks with a parent bank that has higher interest margin. The results from the test
imply that if the parent bank has a better performance in its core business, it would be able to keep supporting their foreign
subsidiary banks during the crisis period thus the subsidiary banks’ lending growth rate would not be significantly affected.
Conversely, if the core business performance of the parent bank is inferior, then a liquidity shock hitting the parent bank
would be transmitted to its foreign subsidiary banks.
Overall, the analysis on the heterogeneity in a parent bank’s characteristics provide strong evidence for the internal cap-
ital market hypothesis. It shows that a parent bank’s balance sheet structures and business capability have significant effect
on the subsidiary bank’s lending activity during the crisis. It is noticeable that the transmission effect is not affected by the
subsidiary bank’s own interest margin and weakness indicator, but can be significantly affected by parent bank’s interest
margin and weakness, which clearly identifies that the liquidity crisis is transmitted through the internal capital market
operating within a bank ownership network.
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